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MÁRTON VARJU* 
 
The Right to Effective Judicial Protection in the System of 
Judicial Review in the European Community  
 
 
Abstract. The system of judicial review in the European Community has recently come under 
scrutiny on grounds of the right to effective judicial protection as provided in Article 6 ECHR 
and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The applicants in cases UPA 
and Jégo-Quéré claimed that in case their action was found inadmissible under Article 230 (4) 
EC, they would be deprived of effective judicial protection since other means of protection 
against violation of law by the Community do not provide adequate remedies. The Court of 
First Instance in Jégo-Quéré responded to the claims of the applicant by concluding that a new 
interpretation of the condition of individual concern laid down under Article 230 (4) EC could 
ensure the right to effective judicial protection in the system of judicial review in Community 
law. In spite of the fact that the Advocate General also envisaged that the amendment of the 
condition of individual concern may guarantee the protection of this right, the Court of Justice 
in UPA rejected such a solution, and stated that it is the duty of the Member States to provide 
effective judicial protection under Community law acting on national or Community level.  
 
Keywords: European Community law, preliminary ruling procedure, action for annulment, 
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Introduction 
 
Criminal Two recent cases1 have shed further light on the understanding of 
the European Courts as regards to the admissibility of actions for annulment 
under Article 230 (4) EC. The Treaty and the right to effective judicial 
protection have always been in conflict, and the European Courts had to do 
their best in order to ensure that both are respected. In the analysed cases 
the European Courts brought judgements, which evaluated the problem in 
different ways. The European Court of Justice (Court) tackled the question 
of enforcing the right to effective judicial protection under Article 230 (4) 
EC actions by examining whether it could depart from the wording of the 
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Article in question in order to ensure effective judicial protection. The Court 
of First Instance (CFI) followed another line of argument concentrating on a 
possible change in judicial attitude towards the notion of individual concern 
in order to establish effective judicial protection. The clear contradiction in 
case law is shadowed, however, by the latter decisions of the CFI, in which it 
followed the position of the Court. Nevertheless, it has been shown that other 
solutions can be admissible in case law. 
 Under the rule of law, Community law must establish a system of review 
of Community measures. The subjects-at-law are entitled to initiate an action 
for annulment of a Community measure, which invests rights or imposes 
obligations on them. During the action for annulment the validity of a Community 
measure is under scrutiny on the following grounds: lack of competence, 
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the 
Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, misuse of powers. 
 Article 230 EC on the action for annulment distinguishes among the subjects-
at-law of Community law on the basis of the scope of their right to initiate an 
action for review. Privileged applicants, such as the Member States, the 
Council, the Commission, and for the purpose of protecting their prerogatives, 
the European Parliament, the Court of Auditors and the European Central Bank 
are entitled to bring an action for annulment of regulations, decisions, 
directives, and the regulations, decisions concerning the European Central 
Bank in the European Court of Justice. The acts of the European Parliament can 
be brought under review, if they are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis 
third parties. In the application for annulment brought by privileged applicants, 
the Treaty does not require the proof of existence of conditions of admissibility, 
contrary to the applications lodged by non-privileged applicants, i.e. natural or 
legal persons.  
 If natural or legal persons wish to attain the direct review of a Community 
measure under Article 230 (4) EC, they must provide proof of the existence of 
serious conditions of admissibility. The Treaty contains three conditions of 
admissibility. Firstly, the nature of the Community measure under scrutiny; 
secondly, the individual concern, and finally, the direct concern. Regarding the 
point of view of the cases analysed below, only the first two conditions are 
significant, rendering the examination of the third condition negligible in this 
case. The Treaty allows non-privileged applicants to bring an action for 
annulment of a Community measure, if the measure is: a decision addressed to 
the applicant; a decision addressed to another party, but the applicant is of 
individual and direct concern to the measure; and, a decision in the form of 
a regulation when the applicant is of individual and direct concern to the 
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measure. It is evident from the rules mentioned above, that non-privileged 
applicants can ask for the review of a measure of specific application 
addressed to them without proving the existence of the other conditions of 
admissibility. The Treaty, however, requires the proof of other conditions of 
admissibility if the applicant asks for the review of a Community measure of 
specific application not addressed to the applicant, or if the Community 
measure in form is of general application, but in substance is of specific 
application. It can be concluded that the Treaty offers the right to initiate an 
action for annulment of a Community measure for non-privileged applicants in 
case the measure is a decision and is addressed to the applicant, or the applicant 
is of individual and direct concern to the decision.2 
 In the case law of the European Court of Justice the examination of whether 
the measure under review was a regulation or a decision, and whether the 
applicant was of individual and direct concern to the measure has been separated 
for a long time. The question of “regulation–decision” was decided under 
Article 249 EC on the basis of being of general or of specific application. If the 
Court thought that the measure under review qualified as a regulation, it could 
declare the action inadmissible without examining whether the applicant was of 
individual and direct concern to the measure. It appeared in case law, however, 
that the applicant was of individual concern to some valid regulations, therefore 
the necessity of the application of the “regulation-decision” test was questioned. 
The Court in Codorniu3 stated that a Community measure of general application 
may be brought under review by a non-privileged applicant, if the applicant was 
of individual concern to the measure. Since Codorniu, individual concern has 
been the thoroughly examined condition of admissibility. The Court defined the 
notion of individual concern in the Plaumann case.4 According to the Court, 
natural or legal persons shall be regarded as individually concerned by a 
measure not addressed to them, if it affects their position by reason of certain 
attributes peculiar to them, or by reason of circumstances which differentiate 
them from all other persons, and distinguishes them individually in the same 
way as the addressee. This means that the applicant must be distinguishable 
from all others by reason of some of his peculiarities, or by reason of a factual 
situation. It can be asserted that both the European Court of Justice and the 
Court of First Instance have applied the Plaumann–test rather strictly. The 
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 See also: Hartley, T. C.: The Foundations of European Community Law. 4th ed. 
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3
 Codorniu SA v. Council C-309/89 [1994] ECR I-1853. 
 
4
 Plaumann & Co. v. Commission C-25/62 [1963] ECR 95, 107. 
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European Courts interpreted individual concern in such way that very few 
actions by natural or legal persons have been found admissible on this basis.5 
 If the European Courts reject the application for annulment on grounds of 
inadmissibility, the only other way of the review of Community law is through 
the preliminary ruling procedure.6 In this procedure the national judge asks the 
Court in the form of judicial questions to decide on the validity of the 
Community measure applied in the proceedings in the national court. This 
procedure, however, does not guarantee access to the European Court of Justice. 
The preliminary ruling procedure requires a procedure in a national court, and 
the posing of a question on validity by the national judge, because the assertion 
[by the party] of the invalidity of the measure does not bind the national judge to 
turn to the European Court of Justice. The preliminary ruling procedure, in our 
view, is not an adequate alternative for Article 230 EC action.7  
 Article 235 EC and Article 288 (2) EC jointly establish a Community remedy 
for individuals against Community violations of law. These dispositions rule 
on the procedure of non-contractual liability of the Community. This procedure, 
nevertheless, is not aimed at the annulment of the Community measure, rather, 
it focuses on the compensation for damages. It can be concluded from the facts 
mentioned above, that the Treaty does not provide complete and effective judicial 
protection for individuals who have rights and obligations derived from the 
Treaty against unlawful Community measures. Since the European Community 
is based on the rule of law, it must ensure that the right to effective judicial 
protection is enforced. This obligation of the Community was recalled under 
the Union de Pequenos Agricultores,8 and subsequently the European Courts 
were asked to revise their standpoint concerning the admissibility of Article 
230 EC action. 
 The argument above is supported by precedents. In ASOCARNE,9 the 
applicant referred to the disadvantages of the review via the preliminary ruling 
procedure, being fully aware of the delay factors in the functioning of the 
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 See also: Neuwahl, N.: Article 173 Paragraph 4 EC: Past, Present and Possible 
Future, 1996 21 EL Rev. 17–31.; Ward, A.: Amsterdam and Amendment to Article 230 
EC: an opportunity lost or simply deferred? In.: The Future of the Judicial System of the 
European Union (ed.: Dashwood, A.–Johnston, A.), 2001. Oxford and Portland, Oregon. 
37–40. 
 
6
 Article 234 EC. 
 
7
 See also: Ward, A.: Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties in EC Law, 
2000. Oxford, 202–287.;  Arnull, A.: The European Union and its Court of Justice. 
Oxford, 1999. 21–69. 
 
8
 Jégo-Quéré et Cie SA v. Commission..., op. cit. par. 28. 
 
9
 ASOCARNE v. Council C-10/95 P [1994] ECR II-871. 
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Spanish judicature, in order to establish the admissibility of action. The Court, 
however, decided that it can only proceed within the framework of the Treaty 
and shall not depart from the conditions of admissibility as set forth under the 
Treaty on the basis that the other judicial channel of review does not provide 
adequate judicial protection. The Court of First Instance in Salamander10 
rejected the argument in which the applicant stated that in case of rejection of its 
application, it would not receive effective judicial protection in the national 
court, because the preliminary ruling procedure is less effective than the 
procedure under Article 230 EC. The court argued that even in case of 
ineffective judicial protection, it cannot amend the Treaty in order to change the 
system of remedies. The features of Article 234 EC action do not establish the 
admissibility of application under Article 230 EC action. In Pescadores,11 the 
Court repeated this standpoint, in spite of the fact that the applicant relied on 
Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) on adequate court procedures. The standing of 
the case law shows that by applying such arguments one cannot efficiently rely 
on the right to effective judicial protection in order to declare an action 
admissible. The question is whether there is another line of argument serving as 
a basis for the European Courts to accept the reference to the right to effective 
judicial protection in annulment cases? In the case examined, first the applicant, 
then the Advocate General tried to convince the European Courts that effective 
judicial protection is not completely accomplished in the Community. 
 
 
Reaffirming judicial attitude towards annulment actions: the UPA case 
 
The application for annulment of Regulation 1638/98/EC12 by the Union de 
Pequenos Agricultores was lodged at the Registry of the Court of First 
Instance on 20 October 1998. The Regulation in question amended Regulation 
136/66/EEC13 on the establishment of a common organisation of the market in 
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 Salamander AG and Others v. Parliament and Council T-172/98, 175-177/98 [2000] 
ECR II-2487. 
 
11
 Federacion de Cofraidas de Pescadores de Guipuzcoa and Others v. Council C-
300/00 P(R) [2000] ECR I-8797, par. 84. 
 
12
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1638/98 of 20 July 1998 amending Regulation No. 
136/66/EEC on the establishment of a common organisation of the market in oils and fats, 
OJ L 210, 28/07/1998. 32–37. 
 
13
 Regulation No. 136/66/EEC of the Council of 22 September 1966 on the establish-
ment of a common organisation of the market in oils and fats, OJ, English Special Edition 
1965–1966, 221. 
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oils and fats, in particular the common organisation of markets in olive oil. 
Fundamentally, the Regulation amended the subvention system of olive oil 
production. The applicant is a trade association, who represents and acts in 
the interests of small Spanish agricultural businesses and is considered a legal 
personality under Spanish law. The Council raised an objection of inadmissibility 
on 23 December 1998. The CFI upheld the objection of inadmissibility and 
dismissed the application as inadmissible. 
 According to settled case law, the CFI examined the nature of the challenged 
provision and decided that it was of general application and was legislative in 
character that it did not substantiate a decision according to Article 249 EC. 
Pursuant to settled case law, the court went on to examine whether the contested 
measure of general application may be of individual concern to the applicant 
that it affects the applicant in a way that he can be differentiated from others 
either by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of 
circumstances. The CFI pointed out that applications from associations were 
found admissible, when the challenged Community act guaranteed procedural 
powers to them, or they represented undertakings, which would [them-
selves] be entitled to bring actions, or when the contested measure affects 
their interests as associations.14 
 When applying the criteria mentioned above, the CFI decided that the 
applicant had not proved that its members could be differentiated from others 
by reason of certain attributes, which are peculiar to them or by reason of 
circumstances. It argued that in spite of the fact that some members of the 
applicant operated in the given market and that some of them were forced to 
give up operation in the market, they could not be differentiated from others 
because their market position is comparable on objective grounds with the 
market position of others even in the present, or in the future. In addition, the 
CFI concluded that the applicant could not prove the existence of any specific 
interest that would imply he was individually concerned. Furthermore, it stated 
that the applicant could not prove the admissibility of his actions under the 
case law concerning associations. 
 The last argument of the applicant focused on the fact that a denial of 
admissibility under Article 230 EC would deprive him from effective judicial 
protection. In his view, there was no legal mechanism in the applicable national 
law that would guarantee the review of Community law via preliminary 
ruling. The CFI declined the argument stating that according to the principle of 
equality, the success of review of Community law must not depend on the 
different conditions stipulated by applicable national law. According to the 
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principle of sincere co-operation as laid down under Article 10 EC, the 
Member States must establish a complete system of remedies in order to 
ensure the review of Community law. On these grounds it is not exclusively 
the court's task to guarantee the right to effective judicial protection, but it is 
the obligation of the Member States. The CFI may not depart from the law to 
guarantee this right. The argument of the applicant that the preliminary ruling 
proceedings would last long under effective rules must not substantiate an 
exemption from the requirements as pursuant to Article 230 (4) EC. 
 In its appeal the UPA presented the following arguments. He stated that 
when the CFI declared the application inadmissible, it violated UPA’s right 
to effective judicial protection guaranteed by Community law. According to 
the appellant, Community law did not provide an alternative remedy to the one 
prescribed under Article 230 EC, because in the given case the procedure 
for preliminary ruling was excluded. Firstly, there was no related national 
regulation, secondly, it was not possible to infringe the provisions of the 
Regulations by virtue of their content that the appellant could institute 
proceedings. The appellant concluded that the CFI must examine in each 
case whether another remedy was at disposal. 
 The Council and the Commission in their intervention rejected the 
arguments of the applicant. According to their views, the conditions for 
actions for annulment were set forth under Article 230 (4) EC, in which the 
right to effective judicial protection was not included. They pointed out that 
the appeal was not aimed at the substantial part of the judgement, in particular 
at individual concern, but it replied to the content of the judgement in the 
light of effective judicial protection. The Council and the Commission stated 
that the Treaty had established a complete system of remedies. When the Member 
States entailed difficulties in the functioning of the system by obstructing the 
course of preliminary ruling proceedings, they violated their obligation of 
sincere co-operation laid down under Article 10 EC. Pursuant to this, the 
proceedings under Article 226 EC shall be instituted against the Member State. 
 The Commission rejected the criticism of the improper functioning of 
the system of remedies as pursuant to the Treaty in the following way. 
When an application is lodged, the relevant national authorities must 
commence proceedings under a directly applicable regulation. If the national 
authority does not commence proceedings in due course or its decision is 
contrary to the interests of the citizen, the national judicial remedies will be at 
disposal and then it is possible to rely on the preliminary ruling procedure. 
 The Court affirmed the conclusions of the Court of First Instance with 
respect to case law concerning Article 230 (4) EC and it recorded the well-
known conditions of action for annulment by non-privileged applicants. After 
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concluding that the appeal basically focused on the guarantee of the right 
of effective judicial protection, the Court went on as follows. Whence, the 
European Community is based on the rule of law, it shall ensure that the law 
created by its institutions is reviewed. Pursuant to this, individuals are entitled 
to effective judicial protection of their rights guaranteed by Community law. 
This entitlement stems from the common constitutional traditions of the 
Member States and is protected by the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The Treaty of Rome has established the complete system of review under 
Community law, which functions via European court actions and national 
court remedies. Inasmuch as the Community has fulfilled this obligation laid 
down in the Treaty, it is the obligation of the Member States to supplement the 
system of effective judicial protection. The courts in the Member States must 
interpret the rules of national law in such a way that the review of Community 
law is possible. Furthermore, it is neither the duty, nor the competence of the 
European Courts to examine the national rules of procedure or national 
substantial law when they decide on admissibility or to decide whether direct 
action under Article 230 EC is required in order to guarantee the right to 
effective judicial protection. The European Courts cannot depart from the 
condition of individual concern in order to declare actions admissible on the 
grounds of the right of effective judicial protection, because the Treaty 
requires them to apply it. If the Member States view the system of remedies 
established by the Treaty inadequate, it is their responsibility to initiate the 
amendment of the Treaty under Article 48 TEU.15 The Court decided that 
the CFI did not err when it declared the action inadmissible without the 
examination of whether another remedy existed. Therefore, the Court rejected 
the appeal. 
 In its judgement the European Court of Justice had to follow two ways of 
reasoning, one concerning Article 230 (4) action and one concerning the right 
to effective judicial protection. If the reasoning on the action for annulment is 
examined, it can be concluded that the Court followed a well-known path. Its 
reasoning is consistent and well-grounded, it pinned down [again] the 
conditions of Article 230 (4) action as prescribed under the Treaty and in case 
law. The Court's reasoning on individual concern was the usual, it must be 
proved that the applicant belongs to a closed category by reason of certain 
attributes peculiar to him or by reason of circumstances in which the applicant 
can be distinguished from others.  
 It is noteworthy that the Court of First Instance, besides applying the 
classical Plaumann-test, decided upon admissibility by examining case law on 
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the admissibility of applications lodged by associations. This means that the 
analysis of the European Courts concentrates on finding a common element in 
the case in front of them and in a previous case, where individual concern was 
established under Plaumann based on the fact in question. The question of 
individual concern is decided by comparing specific facts determined in 
previous cases and not by applying the general concept of individual 
concern as in Plaumann. This means, that according to case law there is a 
separate set of conditions established on the grounds of Plaumann concerning 
the admissibility of applications lodged by associations.16 The use of special 
categories crystallised from the general concept in Plaumann appears not only 
in this specific area, but in such territories, where the decision on individual 
concern is based on peculiarities and circumstances returning case-by-case.17 
This method may facilitate the application of law, however, it may result in a 
stiffening of the applied law. This may exclude a wider domain of inter-
pretation provided under the general concept of individual concern by not 
permitting deflection from the specific conditions of admissibility. 
 Concerning the right to effective judicial protection the Court recognises 
the right and its obligation to guarantee such right. The sole purpose of its 
argumentation, however, is to point out the limits of its powers, which exclude 
the fulfilment of this obligation. Viewing the question from a formal point of 
view, it can be asserted that the Court shall not overreach the facilities provided 
by the Treaty. From the Court's point of view, the system of judicial protection 
is complete, because it may manoeuvre within the limits of the Treaty and 
the Court takes advantage of its elbow–room. The Member States, however, 
under Article 10 EC must create such rules of procedures and the national 
court must interpret and apply these rules in such a way, that the right to 
effective judicial protection prevails in the Community. Moreover, it is the 
obligation of the Member States as objects of international law that by the 
amendment of the Treaty this right is enforced. Consequently, the Court can do 
nothing else but burden those obligated by law with the obligation to establish 
a complete and effective system of judicial protection. That is why, the 

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 Expressly granted procedural powers, members of which are entitled to bring action 
for annulment, own interests, Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. Council... op. cit. par. 47. 
 
17
 Obligation to take into consideration (Piraiki-Patraiki and Others v. Commission C-
11/82 [1985] ECR 207; Sofrimport v. Commission C-152/88 [1990] ECR I-2477; Antillean 
Rice Mills v. Commission T-480/93 and T-483/93 [1995] ECR II-2305), procedural rights 
(Rica Foods v. Commission T-47/00 [2002] ECR II-113, Sociedade Agricola dos Arinhos 
and Others v. Commission T-38/99-50/99 [2001] ECR II-585); special situation (Extramet 
Industrie v. Council C-358/89 [1991] ECR I-2501, Codorniu SA v. Council.. op. cit.). 
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enforcement of the right to effective judicial protection is in the competencies 
of the Member States. 
 The Court pays less attention to the problems concerning the preliminary 
ruling procedure than the Commission, because the Court understands that the 
difficulties of the preliminary ruling procedure lay rather in Community law, 
than in the law of the Member States. Among the dispositions under the 
Treaty, it is not the provisions concerning the preliminary ruling procedure that 
impede the effective review of Community law, since the preliminary ruling 
proceeding is regulated with the intention that it may be initiated when a 
national judge decides so in a dispute in front of him. Moreover, its objective 
was to ensure the uniform interpretation and application of Community law by 
the national courts. The dispositions of judicial review in Community law 
rather obstruct effective review. The Court, however, may not decide against 
the Treaty, hence it is the task of the Member States to alter the provisions in 
the Treaty. 
 The message of the Court seems quite clear. It declines to overreach the 
boundaries of the Treaty, because it is the role of the Member States. 
Certainly, this also means that the Court does not undertake initiating such 
direct action for annulment, through which substantial protection of rights can 
be achieved, without worrying to prove individual concern according to case 
law. The Court camouflages his resistance to change its position concerning 
the admissibility of actions for annulment by non-privileged applicants with 
adequate legal reasoning. Change must be reached through amendment of the 
Treaty. This passivity contradicts [to some extent] the former practice of the 
Court pursued in this area of law, when it often contra legem extended its 
powers under Article 230 EC.18 
 When the Court refers to the amendment of the Treaty, it does not specify 
which provisions of the Treaty it wishes to modify. It must be considered that 
according to Arnull,19 case law of the Court on individual concern reflects a 
judicial intention that non-privileged applicants rather attain the annulment of 
a Community measure via preliminary ruling procedure. Knowing this, it may 
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 Parti Ecologiste Les Verts v. European Parliament C-294/83 [1986] ECR 1339, 
European Parliament v. Council C-70/88 [1990] ECR I-2041, Commission v. Council C-
22/70 [1971] ECR 263, Codorniu SA v. Council… op. cit., Extramet Industrie v. Council… 
op. cit.; see also: Hartley: The Foundations of European Community Law… op. cit. 78–81.; 
de Burca, G.: EU Law. 2nd ed., Oxford, 1998. 86–95. 
 
19
 Arnull, A.: Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment under A 173 of the EC 
Treaty, 1995 32 CML Rev. 41–42, Arnull, A.: Private Applicants and the Action for 
Annulment after Codorniu, 2001 38 CML Rev. 7–52. 
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not be asserted that under amendment of the Treaty the Court understands 
solely the modification of Article 230 EC, but it is assumable that the 
judicial will is also aimed at the amendment of Article 234 EC. It must be 
stated, however, that these procedures serve different purposes and it is 
necessary that the Court is aware of this when it refers to the amendment of the 
Treaty. 
  The European Court of Justice explicitly answered the criticism of its 
decision in such fashion that in a formalistic sense it leaves no room for 
objection. On solid grounds it declined the responsibility to establish the 
complete and effective Community system of judicial protection by judicial 
means. In its answer it appointed the responsible party and it seems that it 
made its role clear. Notwithstanding, it should be asked whether the European 
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance have done everything by their 
own means in order to enforce the right to effective judicial protection and to 
operate a complete and effective system of judicial protection founded by the 
Treaty. 
 However, in a substantial point of view, the activity of the European Courts 
cannot be viewed as adequate. It is true that the courts shall not overreach the 
scope of formal law, nevertheless, when they interpret and apply the law, they 
have room for assigning substance to the units of formal law. Article 230 (4) 
contains the notions of direct and individual concern, which limit the European 
Courts in finding applications for annulment of Community measures 
admissible. The European Court of Justice through the interpretation of 
Community law defined the notion of individual concern in Plaumann. 
According to this, the applicant is individually concerned if the given 
Community measure affects him in a way that the applicant can be 
distinguished from others by reason of certain attributes peculiar to him and 
by reason of circumstances. The substance of this notion was revealed via 
case–by–case application, because the notion contains elements, the meanings 
of which can be explored when they are assigned to the facts in the cases. 
 When the Plaumann–test is scrutinised, it can be asserted that it is not 
conclusively determined whom the applicant shall be distinguished from by 
reason of certain attributes and by reason of circumstances established by the 
Community measure in question. Nothing orders the European Courts where 
and how to set up that category in which those individuals belong and from 
whom the applicant shall differ. The Plaumann–test does not require the 
courts to distinguish the applicants from its present or potential competitors. 
It is not set forth that on others than the workers of the same sector, the 
inhabitants of the same geographical area must be understood. Nothing 
prevents the European Courts from setting up different closed categories case–
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by–case, on the grounds of which the applicant shall be distinguished from 
others. Such analysis of the text of the Plaumann–test indicates that the 
European Courts have and had a wide domain of interpretation when defining 
the meaning of the notion of individual concern. Which demonstrates that such 
interpretation is possible when the right to effective judicial protection is 
enforced in the present system of judicial protection of the Treaty. 
 The above reading of judicial practices of the European Courts is based on 
an interpretation according to which the courts first select a closed category 
that is empty; then they appoint that group of individuals which they think 
belongs to the closed category by reason of attributes peculiar to them or by 
reason of circumstances. In the course of such interpretation, however, when 
the closed category already contains a group of individuals, the membership 
of the closed category is decided by comparing the individuals included in 
the closed category with the ones excluded from it. The comparison is also 
pursued according to the conditions of individual concern in the Plaumann-
test, however, selection is restricted, because a reference group is used. Never-
theless, taking into consideration that the members of the reference group are 
also selected by the courts according to the Plaumann–test, the restriction 
created by the comparison remains virtual, therefore the courts decide on the 
question on the basis of a discrepancy from those they see fit. The first 
interpretation of closed category is based on cases when individual concern 
could not be determined, because besides the applicant, an indefinable number 
of individuals would have been individually concerned.20 The latter reading 
is based on cases in which only a small group of individuals had individual 
concern, and the courts found the applicant not individually concerned by the 
contested measure, because it could not be distinguished from others within 
the group. This interpretation is supported by those arguments by the courts, 
according to which, despite the existence of a small group of individually 
concerned individuals, the individual concern of the applicant was not well-
founded due to the fact that the number of individuals in the group would have 
risen by reason of the appearance of new operators in the market.21 
 What kind of new interpretation shall be given, then? The basis of the 
following approach is that the European Courts shall not interpret the notion 
of individual concern in a way that anyone would have the right to start an 
action for annulment, because it is contrary to the Treaty. Hence such 

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 Stichting Greenpeace Council v. Commission C-321/95 P [1998] ECR I-1651, 
Danielsson v. Commission T-219/95 R [1995] ECR II-3051. 
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 Piraiki-Patraiki and Others v. Commission… op. cit., Calpak SpA and Societa 
Emiliana Lavorazione Frutta SpA v. Commission C-789&790/79 [1980] ECR 1949, par. 9. 
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minimum condition should be found that ensures that the requirement of 
individual concern predominates. If the applicant is able to name his right, the 
violation of which he supposes, the applicant fulfils the requirement of 
individual concern. This also purports that the action of annulment would not 
be open for anybody, because it may be rather difficult to name a violated 
right. Secondly, this new condition will be sufficient to distinguish the 
applicant from others in the meaning of Plaumann, if this is still a requirement, 
because the applicant differs from those, who cannot name such a right. Such 
adjudication of admissibility would not affect questions of substance, so it 
does not qualify as prejudicatio. While the opinion of the Advocate General in 
UPA22 suggests another new interpretation of individual concern, the model 
above will be scrutinised below, together with the approach of the Advocate 
General. It should be noted that the sole purpose of the above mentioned model 
is to prove that European Courts have not reached the limits of judge–made 
law in order to enforce the right to effective judicial protection. European 
Courts, within the structure of the Treaty, have the power to establish the 
complete system of effective judicial protection. The conclusion of the Court is 
incorrect when it asserts that only the Member States are able and obliged to 
act in order to enforce this right. Because, through interpretation, the European 
Courts are also able to create a scope for Article 230 (4) EC so that remedy can 
be given when the rights of individuals are violated. 
 It must be observed, however, slightly contradicting the above, that the 
applicant never argued on the basis of individual concern under the regulation 
in question. The appeal was based solely on the right to effective judicial 
protection. What the applicant demanded was not an adjustment to the notion 
of individual concern, but it asked the Court left the wording of the Treaty in 
order to ensure effective judicial protection. From this point of view, the 
judgement of the Court seems adequate, because the Court declined to 
overreach the boundaries of Article 230 (4) EC. If the Court had been asked to 
reconsider the notion of individual concern in the light of the right to effective 
judicial protection, the Court would have answered in a different way. In spite of 
the fact that the applicant's argument evidently lacked certain aspects, the Court 
should have tackled the question in its entirety.  
 Does the current system of judicial review comply with fundamental 
rights—the dictum of the Advocate General?23 
 It is often useful to analyse the opinion of the Advocate General parallel 
with the judgement of the Court. In this case, however, it is less reasonable, 

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 Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Jacobs on 21 March 2002, [2002] ECR I-6681. 
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because Mr. Jacobs is opposed to the opinion of the applicant, the Council, the 
Commission and the European Court of Justice. This is not contradicted by the 
fact that the Court under paragraph 43 of its judgement refers in consent to 
some points of the opinion of the Advocate General, because in this part of its 
opinion the Advocate General confuted the argument of the applicant, instead 
of orienting the Court in the direction of the interpretation he suggested. 
 The opinion of the Advocate General is one of the most comprehensive 
criticism of the case law of the European Courts concerning Article 230 (4) 
EC. Mr. Jacobs not only opposes the interpretation of the article, but he is up 
against the formalist legal arguments presented by the CFI and later by the 
ECJ. It rejects the solutions proposed in the interventions and refuses to 
agree with the applicant. The Advocate General points out the weaknesses of 
the present system of judicial protection and suggests a solution within the 
framework of the Treaty in order to ensure proper functioning. 
 The review of Community law by non-privileged applicants is pursued via 
two means, one through direct action by Article 230 (4) EC, the other through 
the preliminary ruling procedure under Article 234 EC. The Advocate General 
concluded that according to the case law of the European Court of Justice, the 
primary procedure of review of secondary Community law of general 
application is the preliminary ruling procedure. According to the courts, the 
preliminary ruling procedure makes the system of judicial protection complete 
in the framework of the Treaty, because this procedure is open for those who 
are not able or who were not able to apply for annulment under Article 230 
EC. The Advocate General asserted, however, that the system of judicial 
protection completed by the preliminary ruling procedure is not sufficient to 
enforce the right to effective judicial protection, because of the peculiarities 
of the preliminary ruling procedure. 
 The Advocate General pointed out the following peculiarities. Firstly, he 
asserted that the preliminary ruling procedure cannot be initiated without a 
procedure in a national court or tribunal. This may be impossible when no 
national measure or no damage exists, or the applicant has to initiate a 
procedure against itself. It costs money and time to reach a court of last 
resort in the procedure in the national courts, where it is obligatory to 
request a preliminary ruling. It is not the right of the parties, but the right of 
the judge in a proceeding in a national court to ask for a preliminary ruling. 
This also means that the national judge decides which questions to ask and 
which Community measure it asks to annul. The procedure in the ECJ means 
further delay and costs. The application of an interim measure is also a 
problem, because the order on an interim measure requested in different 
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Member States depends on the discretion of the national courts and different 
orders endanger the uniform application of Community law. The interim measure 
pursuant to Article 230 EC action is valid in all Member States, which 
ensure uniform application. The Community institution, which ordered the 
Community measure in question, is not a party in the preliminary ruling 
procedure contrary to Article 230 EC action. In the action for annulment the 
courts may deal with all questions related to annulment under Article 234 
action, however, the Court is only entitled to answer the judicial questions. 
The application for action for annulment is published in the Official Journal, 
meaning that intervention may occur on a wider scale. The two–month deadline 
in the Article 230 EC procedure ensures that the review of Community law 
takes place as soon as possible, thus enhancing legal certainty opposed to the 
preliminary ruling procedure, which may last for years.24 
 The Advocate General may have missed one important momentum when 
he examined review via Article 234 EC action. Mr. Jacobs asserted that the 
national court is not entitled to declare a Community measure invalid, and 
that it may ask for review in case of grounded suspicion of invalidity. The 
Advocate General nevertheless forgot to deal with the possibility that the 
national judge does not doubt the validity of the Community measure, even if 
it has been referred to by the parties during the procedure. The national 
court is not obliged to ask for preliminary ruling every time suspicion is raised 
on the validity of a Community measure, because by declaring the Community 
provision valid, the question of validity does not appear any more in the 
national court. This momentum may bar out the possibility that the preliminary 
ruling procedure adequately supplements the action for review under Article 
230 EC in order to enforce the right to effective judicial protection in the 
framework of the Treaty. 
 The opinion of the Advocate General points out, however, that the limits of 
this right do not reside exclusively in the peculiarities of the preliminary ruling 
procedure. Mr. Jacobs submitted that the review of Community measures must 
be realised in the framework of Article 230 EC. He stated that the limits of the 
vindication of the right of effective judicial protection lies not in the provisions 
of the Treaty, but in the substance attached by the courts to the provisions of 
the Treaty. The European Courts must create a new meaning of individual 
concern in a way that the review of Community law would be possible without 
violating the right to effective judicial protection. The Advocate General thought 
that the complete and effective system of judicial protection has not been 
established within the framework of the Treaty. The Advocate General did not 

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settle for this call, but proposed a new meaning of individual concern. In his 
view, a person is “individually concerned by a Community measure where, 
by reason of his particular circumstances, the measure has or is liable to have, a 
substantial adverse effect on his interests”.25 
 It is obvious that Mr. Jacobs in his opinion did not request the trans-
formation of Article 230 (4) EC into an actio popularis, but he wanted to keep 
the locus standi provided by the article. One may argue for such 
transformation, nevertheless the opinion focused on the reconstruction of the 
locus standi, so it will be discussed below. 
 It must be premised that the centrepiece of the solution suggested by Mr. 
Jacobs is the dereliction of the main element in Plaumann, the condition that 
the applicant shall be distinguished from others. The interpretation of individual 
concern by the courts limited the admissibility of applications to a large extent, 
because the above mentioned condition of Plaumann allowed the courts to value 
the applicant's uniqueness as an absolute category. In our view, it is not only 
uniqueness that establishes individual concern, but individual concern is 
founded when the applicant can be distinguished from others, together with 
others. Individual concern is not equal to being the addressee of a measure. 
The determination of individual concern shall not be refused on grounds that 
others are similar or they have the potential to be similar to the applicant. The 
requirement of individual concern must work in a way that it excludes those 
who are not concerned, but includes those who are not unique but concerned.  
 Beyond the fact that the Advocate General rejected the requirement of being 
distinguishable from others, the new interpretation of individual concern 
raises different problems. 
 It is difficult to value the notion of interest in legal terms, because there are 
interests that are outside the scope of law, and there are others that have legal 
relevance. In my view, an interest gains legal relevance not when it is referred 
to in a procedure in a court, but when a court in a procedure values it as 
legally relevant. On this basis it is difficult to specify the interest that shall 
have legal relevance and get legal protection. When we speak of rights and 
obligations, however, their relevance and protection by law is obvious. 
 The notion of adverse effect is also difficult to interpret, because it is not 
easy to define when an adverse effect would be perceptible. The palpability of 
adverse effect is a matter of proof in a procedure. When it does not appear 
in the outside world as a fact, it will be impossible to refer to in a procedure. 
Adverse effects may appear near at hand as abuse or in the distance as 
endangering and they may be actual or potential. At which point does it bear 

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relevance? When is it perceptible? The notion of substantial tries to answer to 
these questions, but its meaning still allows such a wide domain for 
interpretation that uncertainty around the meaning of individual concern still 
lingers. 
 The ambiguities in the interpretation of the approach suggested by Mr. Jacobs 
are increased further by the fact that by reason of the particular circumstances 
the measure has or it is liable to have a substantial adverse effect on his 
interest. This can be interpreted in a way that it corresponds to the notions of 
certain peculiar attributes and circumstances known from Plaumann, because 
in some contexts they are the particular circumstances of the applicant. The 
rights and obligations of the applicant may also belong to the notion of 
particular circumstances. This notion, which can be interpreted in different 
ways, still offers a chance for the European Courts to adopt an interpretation of 
individual concern that does not allow for the enforcement of the right to 
effective judicial protection. 
 According to my suggestion for the reduction of uncertainties of inter-
pretation of individual concern, it is sufficient for the applicant to prove 
individual concern to indicate the right or obligation, the protection of which it 
asked for in his application. When determining rights and obligations, well-
established legal categories can be relied upon. Furthermore, it is unnecessary 
to prove effect and substantiality. Being distinguishable is not a condition, 
because the indication of rights and obligations does not require the 
specification of exclusive rights and obligation. An action under Article 230 
(4) EC would not be an actio popularis, since the condition of individual 
concern could not be fulfilled by everybody, since the rights and obligations in 
Community law are often specific. This means that there are individuals, who 
have rights or obligations under a specific measure of Community law and 
there are others who do not. In case of general measures containing rights and 
obligations for all concerned subjects-at-law, exclusion from judicial 
protection is not justifiable. 
 The Advocate General protected his position with different arguments, 
which support both new interpretations. They suppose that the interpretation of 
individual concern by the European Courts is unacceptable, and by reaching a 
new interpretation the European Courts facilitate the establishment of a complete 
and effective system of judicial protection in the framework of the Treaty. By 
applying a new interpretation, the denial of justice (déni de justice) can be 
excluded, and the development of judicial protection could be ensured. If the 
European Courts applied a new interpretation of individual concern, the 
controversies in case law could be resolved. Furthermore, the paradox 
situation implying that the more individuals are affected, the less chance they 
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have to prove that they are individually concerned, would cease to exist. This 
situation is supported by the approach, according to which the more general 
the interest of the review of a Community measure is, the more the institutions 
and the Member States shall be obligated to initiate an action for review. It 
may be submitted, however, that the lack of such action shall not deny access 
to justice for individuals. According to Mr. Jacobs, this would allow the 
European Courts to rule more on the merits, and less jurisdiction in matters of 
admissibility. This does not mean that the Advocate General proposed no 
examination of admissibility in the proceedings, or that the European Courts 
should decide on merits when they consider admissibility. Whence, he neither 
acknowledged that Article 230 (4) EC action was actio popularis, nor argued 
for jurisdiction against legal principles. Mr. Jacobs stated that a more 
permissive interpretation of individual concern would fit in the more liberal 
stance of preceding case law, since the Court often ruled contra legem on the 
grounds of principles of law (the rule of law).26 
 It must be seen, however, that in these cases the European Court of Justice 
served its own purpose expanding its jurisdiction. The less strict approach of 
Article 230 (4) EC action, however, may be contrary to the interest of the 
European Courts, because a relaxed locus standi means a larger number of cases, 
and this increase in workload is not compensated by the increase of judicial 
competence in the Community courts.27 A dangerous increase of workload 
may make the functioning of the European judicature impossible. 
 The Advocate General asserted that the objection against a new inter-
pretation of individual concern cannot be well-grounded. Article 230 EC does 
not exclude the opportunity for a new interpretation. The political, procedural 
difficulties of legislation and its length do not justify that a Community 
measure violating Community law evades review. In addition, the democratic 
deficit of the legislative procedure emphasises the necessity of review. Finally, 
the two–month deadline, the condition of direct concern and the future judicial 
reform make the reference to immense workload as opposed to a relaxed 
interpretation of individual concern senseless.28 
 One argument against a new interpretation of individual concern was that 
case law on individual concern was settled.  

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27
 Rasmussen, H.: Why is Article 173 EC Interpreted against Private Plaintiffs?, 1980 
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28
 Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Jacobs... op. cit. par. 75–81. 
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 Whereas Mr. Jacobs stated that case law is not settled regarding all aspects 
because in several cases the limits of admissibility were indistinct.29 The liberal 
jurisdiction of the national courts and the establishment of the Court of First 
Instance also supports the departure from case law. According to the Advocate 
General, the Court applies an interpretation of the principle of effective 
judicial protection regarding the national courts that it is hard to support the 
strict interpretation on individual concern applied by the European Courts.30 
 The Advocate General not only expounded his point of view, but he 
examined the arguments put forward in the procedure by others. The core of 
the applicant's argument was that in case the application of Article 230 EC 
action was declined, it would not be granted effective judicial protection.31 Mr. 
Jacobs rejected the argument by stating that the Treaty exactly specifies the 
locus standi conditions of Article 230 (4) EC action. Furthermore, the 
European Courts lack the jurisdiction to interpret or annul national laws. An 
examination of national law by the European Courts concerning the possibility 
of a review of Community law may be contrary to the former rule. After all, 
such analysis would establish that admissibility under Article 230 (4) EC 
would be determined by the laws of the Member States.32   
 The standpoint of the Advocate General differs from the point of view of 
the applicant only in that it construes the right to effective judicial protection 
in another context. He asserted that the enforcement of the right resides in the 
alteration of the interpretation of individual concern. The applicant, however, 
stated that if any judicial channel is open for his claim then the right is 
enforced. This argument can be rejected on the grounds that the operation 
of judicial channels shall not depend on each other. Each one is situated in a 
specific environment, their functioning serves specific aims and they require 
particular conditions when initiated. The individual seeking judicial protection 
shall choose the one that is more effective. 
 The Advocate General rejects the submission of the Council and the 
Commission on the functioning of a complete system of judicial protection in 
the Community, and states that Article 234 EC action would not be a right 
even if national rules were changed, because a court–case cannot be created by 
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 Ibid. 22, par. 89–99, see Johnston v. Chief Constable of the URC C-228/84 [1986] 
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amending the rules of procedure. On the other hand, if a review through 
preliminary ruling was made more accessible, it would not help the problem of 
Article 230 (4) EC action.33 
 When analysing the decisions of the European Courts it must be taken into 
consideration that they are the units of a process. They represent a standpoint 
of the law, at the same time they open up new chances for further development 
in the law. That is why, it must be examined which parts of the judgement 
define the future evolution of law. 
 In its judgement the Court rejected its further obligation concerning the 
enforcement of the right to effective judicial protection on formalist grounds. It 
positioned this obligation on the Member States. Now, there is no amendment of 
the Treaty in prospect that would directly concern Article 230 (4) EC. The 
judicial reform in the Treaty of Nice34 may indirectly have such effect, that the 
European Courts would ease the conditions of admissibility. This statement is 
based on the assumption that the cause of judicial conservatism shown during 
the interpretation of the conditions of admissibility is that with strict conditions 
of admissibility the workload of European judicature can be lessened. After the 
Treaty of Nice entering into force, if not the number of applications, but the 
workload on the European Courts will decrease by the distribution of case. 
Therefore, it would be possible to declare more applications admissible. The 
decrease of workload can be influenced by the number of judicial panels, their 
competence and by the number of final judgements in first instance.  
 
 
The CFI departs from settled case law: the Jégo-Quéré judgement 
 
In this procedure the case law on the individual concern of non-privileged 
applicants had a particular turn. The events just heightened the obtuseness 
with the activity of the European Courts in this field. The Advocate General 
presented his opinion on the UPA case on 22 March 2002. The Court of First 
Instance decided in Jégo-Quéré on the 5th of May. The European Court of 
Justice brought its judgement on 25 July 2002. The succession of events 
requires us to assert that in spite of new elements in case law, the legal 
situation has not changed. The analysis of the judgement in Jégo-Quéré shall 
not be ignored, because the decision contains such new judicial approach that, 
in our view, must be followed and the examination of the judgement can point 
out the weaknesses of the new approach. 
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 The applicant French enterprise asked for the annulment of certain 
provisions of Regulation 1162/2001 EC35 from the Court of First Instance 
under Article 230 (4) EC. The Regulation applying to certain fishing vessels 
and its provisions set the minimum mesh sizes used by the vessels. The 
Commission raised an objection of inadmissibility and asked the court to reject 
the application. 
 The argument of the applicant can be divided into two. First, it deals with 
the nature of the given Community measure and with its being of individual 
concern to it. Second, the core of its argument concerns the enforcement of 
the right to effective judicial protection. It asserted that the Regulation is rather 
a bundle of decisions, than a measure of general application. The Regulation 
concerned it individually, because it was distinguishable from others on the 
basis that it was the only French undertaking fishing in the Celtic Sea. In the 
course of legislation the Commission was obliged to observe the fact that the 
applicant fishes for fish that are smaller than hake, therefore, the increase of 
mesh sizes deprives it from its catch.  
 The applicant concluded that besides Article 230 EC action, no other 
means of judicial protection were available and asked the court to adopt a 
relaxed interpretation of Article 230 EC in the light of Article 6 of the ECHR. 
 The argument of the Commission also followed two directions. First, it 
denied the individual concern of the applicant. Furthermore, it stated that the 
applicant was not denied of other means of judicial protection. When it 
examined individual concern, it analysed first the nature of the measure in 
question and asserted that according to case law, even tough it was a measure 
of general application, the applicant may be of individual concern to it.36 
 According to the Commission, however, individual concern was not proven 
in this case, because the scope of the Regulation was set by objective criteria. 
The Regulation applies to all fishing vessels equally within its scope. There 
was no higher rule of law that obliged the Commission to take account of the 
situation of the applicant in the course of legislation. The Commission stated 
that alternative means of judicial protection are Articles 235 and 288 (2) EC, 
which regulate the action for non-contractual liability of the Community. 

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 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1162/2001 of 14 June 2001 establishing 
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 The Court of First Instance, lead by the president of the court, proceeded in 
an extended composition chamber and asserted that the Community measure 
under scrutiny is of general application, because it applies to undefined classes 
of persons and to objectively determined situations. According to settled case 
law,37 measures of general application can be of individual and direct concern 
to some economic operators. The condition of direct concern is fulfilled because 
the application of the Regulation does not depend on the discretion of a third 
person. The examination of individual concern was done by applying the 
general concept of Plaumann, and by applying case law crystallised categories, 
in which individual concern was always established. The court did not accept 
individual concern as proven by the applicant under the notion in Plaumann, 
because the Regulation affects the applicant as a fishing undertaking, and 
as such, it cannot be distinguished from other fishing undertakings. In case 
law, individual concern was established many times, and the legislator was 
obligated to take into account the applicant when making the Community 
measure, however, this time it was not the case. Under Community law, the 
applicant had no procedural rights or guarantees, so these specific cases do not 
establish individual concern of the applicant. The court asserted that the 
applicant was not in a special position, nor had special rights in order to be 
distinguishable from others.38 
 However, the argument of the Court of First Instance took a turn. The 
court ascertained that the Community is based on the rule of law and that 
Community law established a complete system of legal remedies in order to 
facilitate a system of review of Community law.39 The obligation of effective 
judicial protection is based on the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States and on Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR. Under Article 47 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union proclaimed at 
Nice on 7 December 2000,40 the European Courts shall give remedy to the 
party whose rights and freedoms are guaranteed under the law of the Union. 
Fully aware of this obligation, the Court of First Instance stated that the 
inadmissibility of an action for annulment, where a non-privileged applicant 
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requests the annulment of a measure of general application, would mean that 
the applicant shall be deprived of the right to effective judicial protection. 
 According to the court, the review via preliminary ruling is not an adequate 
means of judicial protection, because the enforcement of the right to effective 
judicial protection shall not force an individual to violate the law. The action 
for non-contractual liability of the Community is not an alternative judicial 
remedy, because in this procedure the annulment of Community law does not 
take place. The question of admissibility and the questions on the merits are 
often examined together, as it is excluded in Article 230 EC action. In this 
procedure, the analysis of lawfulness does not reach the same level as in the 
action for annulment.  
 The Court of First Instance asserted that under the ECHR and the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the Community system of 
remedies cannot provide effective judicial protection in a case, when such 
Community measure of general application is under review, directly affecting 
the legal position of the applicant. This situation, however, does not entitle the 
Community judicature to depart from the provisions of the Treaty. The only 
possible solution is the new, relaxed interpretation of individual concern 
within the framework of Article 230 EC. 
 The Court of First Instance gave the following interpretation to the notion 
of individual concern. “In order to ensure effective judicial protection for 
individuals, a natural or legal person is to be regarded as individually concerned 
by a Community measure of general application that concerns him directly, 
if the measure in question affects his legal position, in a manner which is both 
definite and immediate,41 by restricting his rights or by imposing obligations 
on him. The number and position of other persons, who are likewise affected 
by the measure, or who may be so, are of no relevance to that regard.”42 
 By applying the new test, the Court found the applicant individually 
concerned, because the Regulation imposed obligations on Jégo-Quéré. The 
application, therefore, was found admissible. 
 The approach of the Court of First Instance is radical, since it recalls those 
times, when the Court declared actions for annulment of regulations lodged 
by non-privileged applicants admissible.43 This is a judicial approach, which 
had been demanded by the critics and with which, in our view, the European 
Courts had owed for a long time, if they acknowledge that Community law is 
based on the rule of law. The new judicial attitude is welcomed without 
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reservation, if it is expressed in the decision on merits. This means that the 
new interpretation of individual concern shall establish such locus standi, 
which creates the conditions of effective judicial protection within the 
framework of the Treaty. 
 The argument of the court in one section runs parallel with the argument 
applied in UPA. The starting point is the rule of law and the obligation derived 
from it, so that a complete and effective Community system of remedies must 
be established at the disposal of Community subjects-at-law. The court sees 
the effective judicial protection not only as an obligation, but as a right, which 
can be deduced from the common constitutional traditions of the Member 
States, from the ECHR and from the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. In spite of the fact that reference to the latter is questionable 
due to its legal nature, it is acceptable on similar grounds as the reference to 
the ECHR. The Court of First Instance sees in that way that the present system 
of judicial remedies is not complete and effective with respect to the right and 
the obligation mentioned above.  
 At this point the arguments depart. While in UPA the obligation of the 
Member States comes into focus, in this case the court examines the obligation 
of the European Courts regarding the complete and effective system of judicial 
protection. 
 According to the court, in order to enforce the right to effective judicial 
protection, a new interpretation of individual concern is required. The court 
creates the new notion of individual concern from the following elements: 
measure of general application that concerns the legal position of the applicant 
directly; definitely and immediately, by restricting his rights or by imposing 
obligations on him, and the number of persons affected is not relevant. 
 According to the judgement of the Court of First Instance, the court wants 
to apply the new conditions of individual concern only in actions for 
annulment of measures of general application, i.e. regulations. The text of the 
judgement refers to measures of general application, which means that in case 
of a decision addressed to another person or in case of a decision in the form of 
regulation, the applicant in an action for annulment must prove individual 
concern by applying the interpretation in Plaumann. It appears that the Court 
of First Instance does not intend to treat the right to review of non-privileged 
applicants equally in respect of regulations and other Community measures 
mentioned in the Treaty. If the wording of the new interpretation was intended, 
it must be stated that this distinction cannot be justified on the grounds of 
general or individual nature of Community measures. The obligation to 
establish a complete and effective system of remedies requires the court to 
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extend the new interpretation of individual concern to decisions addressed to 
another person and to decisions in the form of regulation.     
 In connection with the nature of the Community measures under review it 
requires an explanation, why it was important in the argument of the parties 
that the Community measure in question was of general application or it was a 
bundle of decisions? Arnull stated that in UPA a similar argument was made 
by the Court, when it stated that the applicant would be of individual concern 
to the regulation in question, because the regulation had the nature of a decision 
in that regard.44 After Codorniu this argument is incomprehensive, however, it 
can be asserted that the examination of the nature of the Community measure 
is a common element in the arguments of judgements of the European Courts.45 
In our view, this is only applied to create a complete line of argument, because 
the courts every time assert that the review of measures of general application 
is possible when individual concern of non-privileged applicants is proven. 
The complete line of argument is needed, because case law somewhat deflects 
from the wording of the Treaty, according to which, the action for annulment 
of regulation is the right of the Institutions, the ECB and the Member States. 
The courts shall reinforce the legal basis of the review case–by–case, which is 
contrary to the Treaty, in order to avoid the questioning of jurisdiction that is 
in compliance with the Treaty. 
 The court inserted the requirement of direct concern into the new concept 
of individual concern. This suggests that the court ensures that both conditions 
in Article 230 (4) EC are fulfilled by the applicant.46 
  According to the judgement in Jégo-Quéré, in order to establish individual 
concern the applicant must prove that the Community measure in question 
affects his legal position in a manner which is both definite and immediate, 
so it restricts his rights or imposes obligation on him. If the notions of 
restriction of rights and imposition of obligations imply the meaning of the 
notion of definite and immediate effect on the legal position, it is questionable 
whether it is necessary to include both the result of interpretation and the 
notion under interpretation in the new concept of individual concern. If the 
expressions can substitute each other, in our view, it is sufficient to indicate 
only the restrictions of rights and the imposition of obligations, because 
these notions restrict the European Courts in their discretion when deciding 
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on admissibility. Legal certainty requires such legal provisions that make 
legal actions predictable. 
 When the expressions are not substitutable, it is difficult to define the notion 
of effect on legal position. Although, the application of the categories of 
“definite” and “immediate” can narrow the domain of interpretation defined by 
“restriction of rights and imposition of obligations”. Case–by–case the 
content of the new interpretation of individual concern could be defined, if the 
premises applied in the enforcement of the right to effective judicial protection 
are derived from the rule of law. 
 The Court of First Instance undoubtedly indicated that it wanted to 
relinquish the application of the method in Plaumann, which required the 
courts to distinguish the applicant from all others. It undertook to concentrate 
solely on the position of the applicant irrespective of others surrounding him. 
This is the only part of the new conditions of individual concern that is 
worth welcoming, because the above mentioned critical remarks show the 
shortcomings of the new method of examining individual concern suggested 
by the court. This means that in spite of the fact that the court stopped applying 
the method of closed category, it rejected to restrict its operations within the 
frame of well-definable notions. 
 The purpose of examining uncertainty is not to prove that a concept of 
individual concern that has absolute meaning is necessary, rather it is to point 
out the advantages of the method suggested by us against the suggestions of the 
Advocate General and the court. We think that the new concept of individual 
concern should bear the highest degree of certainty without the exclusion of 
individuals from the review of Community measures. 
 At this point, it is necessary to compare the core solutions of the three 
suggested methods in order to choose the most adequate. The Advocate 
General gave the widest domain to individual concern, when he required the 
proof of substantial adverse effect on the applicant’s interest. Our suggestion 
of the indication of rights and obligations defines a narrower scope, because 
rights and obligations represent a narrower domain than interests. The 
restriction of rights and imposition of obligations suggested by the Court of 
First Instance is the narrowest interpretation, because that requires activated 
rights and obligations. Parallel to this, it can be stated that by narrowing the 
domain of interpretation the definability of the concepts increased. While 
the notion of interest applied in the first solution is definable with difficulty, 
the content of rights and obligations, restriction of rights and imposition 
of obligation can be determined easier. In our view, the limitation of the 
concept to restriction of rights and imposition of obligations is unjustified, 
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because remedies shall not be provided only for those whose right has been 
restricted or who has been obligated. Rather, those shall also have a share 
in judicial protection, whose right would be restricted or whom obligation 
would be imposed upon. The Community measure under review does not 
always cause immediate violation of law, but it often carries this 
potential.47 If a Community measure violates Community law, it does not 
mean that it also violates the rights of an individual, because the grounds of 
illegality in Article 230 EC only means the violation of Community law and 
not the rights of an individual. That is why it is necessary to establish such 
concept of individual concern that provides that individuals, whose rights can 
potentially be violated by a Community measure, may ask for the review of that 
Community measure. It is not justified to leave the action for review of the 
Community measure in case of indefinite and not immediate violation of law 
to privileged applicants, because without being affected they will not perceive 
that the Community measure does indeed violate Community law. The affected 
individuals have no such mechanism at their disposal through which they 
could enforce any privileged applicant to launch an action for annulment. The 
most effective way to enforce the right to effective judicial protection is to 
ensure that the affected persons have the right to initiate such proceedings. 
 In the course of analysis other factors outside the scope of law must be 
considered. The publication of the opinion of the Advocate General a few weeks 
ago must have had a great effect on the development of the judicial approach. In 
spite of the fact that the applied interpretations on individual concern differed, the 
starting point of their approach was the same: the need for a new interpretation 
in order to establish effective judicial protection in the Community. 
 In this case a regulation of the Common Fisheries Policy was under review. 
This sector is in deep crisis, because the amount of fish in the seas has 
decreased significantly as a consequence of excessive fishing activity. The 
reforms suggested and implemented by the Commission sensitively affect the 
undertakings in the sector, because their means of earning a living is in danger. 
The reception of the measures of the Commission often degenerates into 
violent acts by these people. Every week, during protests against the new rules, 
the fresh catch is dumped in front of the buildings of fishing authorities. When 
courts apply the law, they shall not leave the social circumstances [behind 
the law] out of consideration. 
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Closing remarks 
 
The new radical concepts emerging in case law and in the opinion of the 
Advocate General have grounds to call the constructive judicial activity of the 
Court, which has defined Community law in its basis, on account. It is 
questionable that the European Court of Justice rejects the two reform concepts 
on purely formalistic legal grounds. That Court, which have created the 
missing elements of the Community system of judicial protection of 
individuals in its case law, cannot back out from the obligation of further 
perfection of the Community system of remedies. 
 The significance of Jégo-Quéré is that the Court of First Instance rejected 
the condition of being distinguishable from others, as the core element of 
the concept of individual concern. According to this, the applicant has to 
concentrate on his position in the proceeding. In our view, however, under the 
criteria set in the case, the group of individuals, who may qualify as individually 
concerned, is set narrow without reason. Only in case of real violation of law, 
i.e. restriction of rights or imposition of obligations, would their actions be 
admissible. Judicial interpretation would preclude individuals whose rights are 
not violated directly at the effective date of the Community measure and allow 
action for them later, when the result aimed by the Community measure ensues. 
Nobody shall be excluded from the review of a Community measure violating 
Community law, if the right of that person would be violated by the later effect 
of the unlawful measure. 
 In the light of the UPA judgement it must be stated that according to case 
law individual concern must be interpreted as in Plaumann.48 According to the 
argument of the applicant in UPA, it had locus standi under Article 230 EC 
action because Article 234 EC action was not open for his application, 
therefore, in order to enforce the right to effective judicial protection, the direct 
action for review shall stand for its disposal. The Court rejected the argument 
by stating that it had no jurisdiction to examine national laws whether they 
serve Article 234 EC action appropriately. The Court of First Instance rejected 
the same argument on the same basis in case SLIM Sicilia only a month after 
the judgement in Jégo-Quéré.49 Three months after the decision in Jégo-Quéré, 
the President of the CFI repeated the UPA judgement stating that the lack of 
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other means of judicial protection does not require the court to depart from the 
conditions of admissibility set in Article 230 (4) EC.50 
 In view of the functioning of the European Courts, the Jégo-Quéré judge-
ment is not the result of a communication failure. The European Court of 
Justice does not want to alter the present set of conditions. It must be seen, 
however, that the judgement in Jégo-Quéré is the part of Community law, and 
it has not been reversed yet by the European Court of Justice in an appeal 
procedure. The judgement of the Court of First Instance can be relied upon and 
it will be relied upon. Furthermore, the proceedings in Jégo-Quéré are still 
underway, only the question of admissibility was decided. The decision on 
merits will follow the possible appeal, the opinion of the Advocate General 
will come later, and finally, the judgement of the European Court of Justice 
will hopefully clarify the situation. The process is not over yet and it is still 
possible that the interpretation of individual concern will change in the 
forthcoming months.51 
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